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Abstract 
The foundation of the Internet is showing cracks. Central elements of the 
Internet’s infrastructure are the result of decisions made decades ago. Since 
then, however, the technical context has changed dramatically, as has the 
political significance of the Internet. 
Three conflicts over the future development of the Internet infrastructure 
are particularly important for German policy-makers. The first is about secu-
rity and privacy in the Internet’s addressing system, the so-called Domain 
Name System (DNS). Second, a conflict is building up over the security of the 
Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) – the protocol used to coordinate data traffic 
on the Internet. Third, the security and availability of submarine cables, 
which form the physical backbone of the global Internet, are proving in-
creasingly problematic. 
If these conflicts remain unresolved, while at the same time the demands 
on the Internet continue to rise worldwide, the consequences for security, 
privacy, and economic development will be increasingly negative. Moreover, 
the Internet is in danger of being split, all the way to the infrastructure level. 
This multifaceted field of conflict demands a clear strategic approach 
from German policy-makers. In accordance with their own digital policy 
demands, they should at the same time pursue the goal of worldwide inter-
operability and address the issues described within a European framework. 
The challenge here is to shape the further development of the Internet infra-
structure in Europe in such a way that it complements – and does not fur-
ther jeopardise – the shared global foundation of the Internet. 
 
  
 
SWP Research Paper 
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik 
German Institute for 
International and Security Affairs 
 
 
Daniel Voelsen 
Cracks in the 
Internet’s Foundation 
The Future of the Internet’s Infrastructure and Global Internet Governance 
 
SWP Research Paper 14 
November 2019, Berlin 
  
 
 
All rights reserved. 
© Stiftung Wissenschaft 
und Politik, 2019 
SWP Research Papers are 
peer reviewed by senior 
researchers and the execu-
tive board of the Institute. 
They are also subject to fact-
checking and copy-editing. 
For further information 
on our quality control pro-
cedures, please visit the 
SWP website: https:// 
www.swp-berlin.org/en/ 
about-swp/quality-
management-for-swp-
publications/. 
SWP Research Papers reflect 
the views of the author(s). 
SWP 
Stiftung Wissenschaft und 
Politik 
German Institute 
for International 
and Security Affairs 
Ludwigkirchplatz 3–4 
10719 Berlin 
Germany 
Phone +49 30 880 07-0 
Fax +49 30 880 07-200 
www.swp-berlin.org 
swp@swp-berlin.org 
ISSN 1863-1053 
doi: 10.18449/2019RP14 
(English version of 
SWP-Studie 12/2019) 
  
  
Table of Contents 
 5 Issues and Recommendations 
 7 Internet Governance As a Task for  
German Policy-makers 
 7 Governance 
 7 Tasks and Goals of German Policy-makers 
 10 The Current Model of Internet Governance 
 10 Global Standards 
 11 Authoritative Rule-setting by ICANN 
 12 Legitimacy through Multi-stakeholder Governance 
 14 Conflicts over the Global Infrastructure  
of the Internet 
 15 Security and Privacy in the Domain Name System (DNS) 
 16 Security in the Routing System 
 18 Security and Availability of Submarine Cables 
 22 Authoritative Rule-setting As a Way Out? 
 22 ICANN: Politicisation 
 24 ITU: Blockade 
 27 Two, Three, Multiple Internets? 
 30 Recommendations for German Internet 
Governance Policy 
 30 The Strategic Context 
 31 Priorities 
 31 Restricting ICANN to Its Core Technical Functions 
 33 Public Support for Multi-stakeholder Institutions in the 
ITU and the IGF 
 33 Updates to the Internet Infrastructure on the 
European Level 
 35 Abbreviations 
 
  
 
Dr Daniel Voelsen is an Associate in the Global Issues Division 
at SWP 
 
  SWP Berlin 
 Cracks in the Internet’s Foundation 
 November 2019 
 5 
 
Issues and Recommendations 
Cracks in the Internet’s Foundation. 
The Future of the Internet’s Infrastruc-
ture and Global Internet Governance 
The lifestyle of modern societies is increasingly 
dependent on the exchange of information via the 
Internet. This is especially true for the economy, 
but increasingly also for state institutions. Reports 
on the political and economic consequences of hacker 
attacks clearly illustrate how indispensable the Inter-
net has become for public and private institutions – 
and how vulnerable they are. 
The focus is usually on institutions threatened by 
attacks. In contrast, the infrastructure of the Internet 
is hardly considered in this context. A multitude of 
protocols and standards, together with the physical 
network of cable connections and routers, form this 
infrastructure – and thus the global foundation of 
the Internet. Originating in the United States, this 
infrastructure developed worldwide in the course 
of the 1990s, and with it the no-less-complex insti-
tutional network of global Internet governance. 
Increasingly, however, cracks are appearing in the 
foundation of the Internet. Central elements of the 
infrastructure are the result of decisions made dec-
ades ago. Since then, the technical context has changed 
dramatically, as has the political significance of the 
Internet. In light of the goals that German policy-
makers have set for themselves, three conflicts over 
the Internet infrastructure are of particular impor-
tance. 
The first concerns the security of the Domain Name 
System (DNS), that is, the technical system for assign-
ing domain names and IP addresses. Configurations 
that once made sense now lead to serious security 
gaps and create simple ways to violate the privacy of 
Internet users. There are mature proposals for solu-
tions to these problems, but they cannot be imple-
mented in the existing Internet governance struc-
tures. 
Secondly, there is a conflict over the security of the 
routing system. The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) 
provides the technical means to coordinate the trans-
port of data within the decentralised structure of the 
Internet. In recent years, however, there has been an 
increasing number of cases in which states and pri-
vate actors have used this protocol to manipulate data 
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traffic on the Internet. Here, too, solutions exist that 
are not being implemented. 
Thirdly, the security and availability of submarine 
cables are proving to be increasingly problematic. The 
majority of these cables are operated by private com-
panies, whose planning understandably is based on 
economic criteria. The consequence, however, is that 
individual routes and landing points are frequently 
reused – resulting in particularly vulnerable “choke 
points”. Moreover, many developing countries are in-
sufficiently connected to the global submarine cable 
network. In this respect, a largely overlooked conflict 
exists between the security interests of the states and 
the interests of the companies involved. 
If these conflicts remain unresolved, while at the 
same time the demands on the Internet continue to 
rise worldwide, this will have increasingly negative 
consequences for security, privacy, and economic 
development. In addition, the conflicts point to a sys-
temic problem of global Internet governance. Non-
state actors, above all private companies, have a for-
mative influence here. They provide important public 
goods in the form of protocols and standards, but 
they have neither the economic incentives nor the 
necessary legitimacy to bring political conflicts to an 
end through authoritative rule-making. Even where 
technically mature solutions are available, the Inter-
net infrastructure is therefore not being developed in 
the necessary way. 
In principle, two institutions could fill this gap: the 
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Num-
bers (ICANN) and the International Telecommunica-
tion Union (ITU). On closer inspection, however, both 
prove to be ill-suited. The current political controver-
sies surrounding ICANN show that the organisation 
does not have the necessary legitimacy to set authori-
tative standards beyond a limited technical scope. 
Although this aspect is less of a problem for the ITU 
as a specialised agency of the United Nations, there is 
fundamental dissent among the member states of the 
institution on issues of Internet governance, which is 
why the ITU has been blocked on this issue for a long 
time and will probably remain so for the foreseeable 
future. 
Against this background, the concern about a pos-
sible fragmentation of the Internet becomes particu-
larly acute. At the level of Internet services, regulatory 
fragmentation along national borders is already a 
practical reality. The crucial question, however, is 
whether this fragmentation will propagate to the 
level of the Internet infrastructure. The inability of 
today’s institutions to solve the problems of the global 
Internet infrastructure creates a breeding ground for 
this. Companies such as Google and Mozilla already 
offer their own DNS services. China and Russia have 
also repeatedly signalled their interest in setting up 
an alternative infrastructure. There is thus a growing 
danger that the cracks in the foundation of the Inter-
net will turn into genuine fractures. 
This conflict situation demands a clear strategic 
orientation from German policy-makers. In line with 
the goals set by German policy-makers themselves, 
they should simultaneously pursue the goal of global 
interoperability and address the problems described 
within a European framework. The non-trivial chal-
lenge here is to shape the further development of the 
Internet infrastructure in Europe in such a way that 
it complements – and does not further jeopardise – 
the common global foundation of the Internet. 
These objectives can be translated into three 
recommendations for German policy-makers. The 
first is to work towards limiting ICANN to those core 
technical functions that are necessary for the opera-
tion of the DNS. A unified DNS is essential to the goal 
of global interoperability, and it is in this area that 
ICANN’s authority is widely recognised. Second, 
German policy-makers should use their influence in 
the ITU and the Internet Governance Forum (IGF) to 
provide support to multi-stakeholder institutions 
wherever they make important contributions to the 
technical development of the global Internet infra-
structure. Third and finally, Germany should make 
every effort to tackle within the European Union (EU), 
as far as possible, those problems of this infrastruc-
ture that cannot currently be solved at the global 
level. This should be done out of a well-understood 
self-interest, but also with a view to stimulating 
global development. 
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The term “Internet governance” is politically con-
tested. This is no small problem for scholarly analysis, 
as the subject itself is already controversial.1 One way 
of dealing with this challenge is to define the term 
Internet governance so broadly that it covers all po-
litical phenomena somehow related to the Internet.2 
In this study, however, the practice of Internet gov-
ernance is examined on the basis of a narrower, ana-
lytical conception of governance, which at the same 
time highlights the political significance of this 
practice. 
Governance 
The starting point for the understanding of Internet 
governance proposed here is a definition of govern-
ance that Thomas Risse and Tanja Börzel prominently 
introduced in the political science debate on “govern-
ance”. They define governance as institutionalised 
forms of political coordination “to produce and im-
plement collectively binding rules, and/or to provide 
collective goods”.3 Based on this understanding of 
governance, Internet governance is defined as the 
sum of all those institutionalised forms of political 
 
1 See Jeanette Hofmann, Christian Katzenbach, and Kirsten 
Gollatz, “Between Coordination and Regulation. Finding the 
Governance in Internet Governance, New Media & Society 19, 
no. 9 (2016): pp.. 1406–23; Julia Pohle, Maximilian Hösl and 
Ronja Kniep, “Analysing Internet Policy As a Field of Strug-
gle”, Internet Policy Review 5, no. 3 (2016): 1–21. 
2 See Laura DeNardis, Protocol Politics. The Globalization of 
Internet Governance (Cambridge, MA, 2009), 14. 
3 Tanja Börzel, Thomas Risse and Anke Draude, “Govern-
ance in Areas of Limited Statehood. Conceptual Clarifica-
tions and Major Contributions of the Handbook”, in The 
Oxford Handbook of Governance and Limited Statehood, ed. Tanja 
Börzel, Thomas Risse and Anke Draude (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2018), 3–25. 
coordination aimed at setting binding rules and/or 
providing collective goods in relation to the Internet. 
It is deliberately kept open in this context as to 
which actors set the rules or provide goods and how 
they do this. In particular, this is intended to raise 
awareness of the fact that governance is not always 
a matter solely for the state. At the same time, the 
definition draws attention to the fact that it is about 
the intentional provision of collective goods. Thus, 
unintended effects cannot be described as govern-
ance, and neither does conscious coordination to 
spread evils qualify as governance (e.g. in the form 
of organised crime).4 
Specific governance constellations always reflect 
the power relations between the actors involved. This 
explains why governance is always in need of justifi-
cation. This applies in particular to the setting and 
enforcement of collectively binding rules, that is, 
the exercise of authority. But there is also a need for 
justification in the provision of collective goods if it 
takes place against the background of existing power 
asymmetries and if it is likely to perpetuate them. 
Tasks and Goals of German Policy-makers 
As technical as Internet governance may often seem, 
at its core it is about fundamental questions of politics. 
Which institutions and actors have the right to set 
rules on the basis of which procedures, that is, to 
exercise authority? Which institutions and actors are 
responsible for providing which collective goods and 
under which conditions? Which interests are pursued 
 
4 Tanja Börzel and Thomas Risse, “Governance without 
a State. Can It Work?”, Regulation & Governance 4 (2010):  
113–34 (115). 
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in this process, and how does this affect power rela-
tions?5 
Just as the Internet is a global communications 
network, so too do these issues have global reach – 
and therefore always also fall within the scope of 
foreign policy. Traditionally, however, in many coun-
tries Internet governance is primarily treated as an 
economic policy issue. In Germany, too, the Federal 
Ministry of Economic Affairs (BMWi) is the lead 
agency within the federal government. In particular, 
the ministry is responsible for representing Germany 
at the ITU and ICANN; the BMWi is also responsible 
for organising the IGF in 2019 (see Box 3, p. 12). The 
Federal Ministry of Transport and Digital Infrastruc-
ture, the Federal Ministry of the Interior, Building 
and Home Affairs, and the Federal Foreign Office are 
regularly involved. The way in which the topic is 
dealt with in the Bundestag corresponds to this divi-
sion of responsibility on the part of the ministries; 
however, questions of global Internet governance in 
particular receive little attention here. 
Since there has been no broader debate on the 
global Internet infrastructure to date, public state-
ments on the goals of German policy in this area have 
also been limited. Nevertheless, some fundamental 
objectives can be derived from the general principles 
of German foreign policy, from the “Digital Agenda” 
published by the federal government in 2014, and 
 
5 See Laura DeNardis, The Global War for Internet Governance 
(New Haven, CT: Oxford University Press, 2014). 
from a number of statements, in particular by the 
BMWi: 
∎ #Z1: Promoting the digital economy. Across all 
political camps, in Germany the Internet is per-
ceived as an opportunity for economic develop-
ment. Although there are repeated reminders of 
the potential negative consequences of the Internet 
for parts of the labour market, positive expecta-
tions prevail. The buzzword “Industry 4.0”, for 
example, has recently attracted much attention. 
The “Digital Agenda” of 2014 contains an explicit 
reference to the regulatory goal of free and fair 
competition.6 In the context of the political discus-
sions on global Internet governance, this can be 
understand as setting the goal of maintaining the 
Internet as a worldwide communication medium 
for economic activities and, if possible, expanding 
it further. 
∎ #Z2: Strengthening the security of IT systems. In 
Germany, the security of IT systems plays an im-
portant role in the digital policy debate. The topic 
has attracted much attention in recent years as a 
result of hacker attacks on the Bundestag and the 
federal government’s network. In addition, com-
panies report an increase in economically motivated 
attacks. The goal of making the use of the Internet 
secure for public authorities and companies, but 
also for individual citizens, can be extended to the 
level of global Internet governance: A sufficient 
level of security of the global Internet infrastruc-
ture is a prerequisite for the security of Internet 
services that make use of this infrastructure. 
∎ #Z3: Protection of human rights also in the digital 
space. Human rights are recognised as one of the 
central normative orientation points of German 
foreign policy. In recent years in particular, the 
federal government has repeatedly emphasised 
that this also applies to digital space. Germany’s 
commitment to the Freedom Online Coalition sends 
a clear signal in this direction. The main focus is 
on the right to privacy, freedom of opinion, and 
freedom of the press.7 At the end of 2018, the fed-
eral government endorsed Tim Berners-Lee’s pro-
posal for a “Contract for the Web”, which empha-
 
6 Die Bundesregierung, Digital Agenda 2014–2017 (Berlin, 
2014), 4, https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/EN/Artikel/Digital-
World/digital-agenda.html (accessed 14 March 2019). 
7 Auswärtiges Amt, International Cyber Policy, https://www. 
auswaertiges-amt.de/en/aussenpolitik/themen/cyber-
aussenpolitik (accessed 14 March 2019). 
Box 1 
Public and collective goods 
Public goods are distinguished from private goods by two 
conditions: (a) access to them is equally free for all (non-
excludable), and (b) the use of the goods by one person does 
not restrict the use for others (non-rival). Both conditions are 
based on political provisions. Whether, for example, knowl-
edge is treated as a public or private good is by no means 
determined by the matter itself. Collective goods differ from 
public goods in that only one of these two conditions must 
be fulfilled.
a
 
a Tanja Börzel, Thomas Risse and Anke Draude, “Govern-
ance in Areas of Limited Statehood. Conceptual Clarifica-
tions and Major Contributions of the Handbook”, in The 
Oxford Handbook of Governance and Limited Statehood, ed. Tanja 
Börzel, Thomas Risse and Anke Draude (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2018), 3–25. 
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sises free access to the Internet and the right to 
privacy.8 This repeated commitment to the applica-
tion of human rights in the digital space also leads 
to objectives for the level of Internet infrastructure. 
After all, it is here that the technical course is set 
for whether and to what extent censorship is made 
possible, or how the privacy of Internet users is 
protected. 
∎ #Z4: Strengthening multi-stakeholder governance. 
With particular regard to the context of global 
Internet governance, the federal government has 
for many years explicitly committed itself to multi-
stakeholder governance. In 2015, for example, the 
BMWi, together with a number of German interest 
groups, clearly declared itself in favour of trans-
ferring the administration of the DNS (see Box 2, 
p. 12) to ICANN. One of the main reasons given 
was that this institution was organised in accord-
ance with the multi-stakeholder model.9 The Bun-
destag’s Enquete Commission on Internet and 
Digital Society also clearly positioned itself in 
favour of this model in a report from 2013. Not 
least, the federal government is prominently sup-
porting the IGF (see Box 3, p. 12) by hosting the 
forum in 2019. 
∎ #Z5: Maintaining interoperability. The commit-
ment to the existing structures of multi-stake-
holder governance is often closely tied to the goal 
of interoperability.10 Essentially, interoperability 
refers to the possibility that the various elements 
of the Internet can communicate with each other 
despite their technical diversity. The Internet 
consists of numerous subnets, connects the most 
diverse types of devices, and is used for the most 
diverse purposes. Data exchange across these 
various forms of use is not always desirable; in 
principle, however, it is possible as long as every-
one uses the same infrastructure. The technical 
 
8 Marie-Charlotte Matthes, “Schnelles und offenes Internet 
für alle: Bundesregierung unterzeichnet ‘Contract for the 
Web’”, netzpolitik.org (online), 28 November 2018, https:// 
netzpolitik.org/2018/schnelles-und-offenes-internet-fuer-alle-
bundesregierung-unterzeichnet-contract-for-the-web/ (ac-
cessed 14 March 2019). 
9 BMWi, Position deutscher Interessengruppen. Leitlinien und 
Handlungsempfehlungen zur Überleitung der Aufsicht über die IANA-
Funktionen (Berlin, 2015). 
10 See etwa Deutscher Bundestag, 17. Wahlperiode, Druck-
sache 17/12480, Elfter Zwischenbericht der Enquete-Kommission 
“Internet und digitale Gesellschaft”. Internationales und Internet 
Governance (28 February 2013), 20. 
concept of interoperability can therefore be trans-
lated into the political goal of maintaining the 
globally unified infrastructure of the Internet. 
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The origins of the Internet have their roots in sub-
stantial public investments. A key driver was the US 
military’s interest in a decentralised communications 
system. At the beginning of the 1990s, however, the 
Clinton administration opted for a far-reaching policy 
of privatisation: The task of further developing the 
Internet and creating a corresponding infrastructure 
for the general population was entrusted to private 
companies.11 
In the course of the global spread of the Internet, 
this model was adopted by most countries. Access to 
the Internet is usually provided by private Internet 
service providers (ISPs), which either connect directly 
to global network operators or use privately operated 
Internet nodes (Internet exchange points, IXPs) to 
connect to the global network. The latter, in turn, 
consists of a complex of fibre-optic and satellite 
connections, most of which are also privately owned. 
This prominent role of private actors is also reflected 
in today’s Internet governance structures. ISPs, IXPs, 
and providers of Internet services are subject to the 
legal requirements of the countries in which they 
offer their services. Those technical standards, how-
ever, which create the global and domestic basis for 
communication on the Internet, are developed by pri-
vate actors. Non-hierarchical cooperation comprises 
the dominant form of governance here (see p. 7), with 
the addition of ICANN’s limited claim to authority 
(see Table 1). 
The distinction between Internet services and Internet 
infrastructure is analytically helpful. Since the 1990s, 
a large number of Internet services have emerged, 
ranging from simple websites and chat rooms to to-
day’s social networks and messaging services. 
 
11 Ev Ehrlich, “Thanks to Bill Clinton, We Don’t Regulate 
the Internet Like a Public Utility”, Forbes (online), 17 May 
2014, https://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2014/03/17/ 
thanks-to-bill-clinton-we-dont-regulate-the-internet-like-a-
public-utility/ (accessed 19 December 2018). 
The Internet’s mode of operation relies on the 
premise that all of these different services are ulti-
mately based on a manageable set of basic protocols 
for transmitting data. These protocols are referred to 
as the logical infrastructure of the Internet (whereby 
“logical” here is essentially to be understood as a ref-
erence to software). They are designed to enable the 
various forms of Internet usage to be brought to-
gether in a unified technical structure. This structure 
follows a layered architecture; the higher layers con-
tain more specific protocols and are based on the 
lower layers. It is common today to describe the logi-
cal infrastructure as a whole using the Transmission 
Control Protocol/ Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) model. In 
addition, there is the physical infrastructure in the 
form of cable connections, routers, and servers. 
Global Standards 
The logical infrastructure of the Internet therefore 
consists of a series of standards and protocols. Promi-
nent examples are Hypertext Markup Language 
(HTML) for displaying websites and the Unicode stand-
ard for merging different font and character systems. 
For the most part, such standards and protocols are 
developed and made available by private actors. These 
come together in institutions such as the Internet 
Engineering Task Force (IETF), the Institute of Elec-
trical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), and the World 
Wide Web Consortium (W3C). In principle, participa-
tion is open to all interested parties. In fact, however, 
the technical level required for such participation is 
so high that it is mainly representatives of key com-
panies and, to a limited extent, scientists who gather 
here. The Internet Architecture Board (IAB) provides 
an impression of the usual composition of such insti-
tutions. Within the IETF, it exercises a limited super-
visory function over standard-setting processes. Of the 
twelve members of this committee, ten are currently 
The Current Model of 
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working for companies in the Internet industry, while 
two are scientists from universities.12 
The standards and protocols developed in forums 
such as the IETF, the IEEE, and the W3C are public 
goods (see Box 1, p. 8). They are made publicly avail-
able and are free to use by everyone (non-excludable), 
and they can be used by an unlimited number of 
people (non-rival). In fact, it is actually in the interest 
of those who develop these protocols that they be 
used as much as possible.13 
The standards are developed on the basis of volun-
tary cooperation. The dissemination of the standards 
is also voluntary in form. An institution such as the 
IETF cannot dictate to states or companies which 
standards they have to use. In this sense, this is a case 
of the non-hierarchical provision of a public good 
(see Table 1). 
The absence of formal hierarchies, however, does 
not mean that power relations do not exist. In par-
ticular, the companies concerned try to assert their 
interests in the committees of institutions such as the 
 
12 Internet Architecture Board – Members, https://www.iab. 
org/about/iab-members/ (accessed 18 April 2019). 
13 Joseph S. Nye, The Regime Complex for Managing Global 
Cyber Activities (Waterloo: Global Commission on Internet 
Governance, 2014), 6, https://www.cigionline.org/sites/ 
default/files/gcig_paper_no1.pdf (accessed 14 September 
2018). 
IETF. A current example of this is the strong involve-
ment of the Chinese company Huawei in shaping 
the new 5G mobile communications standard.14 Com-
panies also use their market power to help certain 
standards achieve widespread adoption. 
Authoritative Rule-setting by ICANN 
The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and 
Numbers occupies a special position in the structure 
of global Internet governance. For one thing, it 
authoritatively sets collectively binding rules for the 
DNS (see Box 2). ICANN thus determines how, and un-
der what conditions, domain names and IP addresses 
are allocated on the Internet. Second, the organisa-
tion provides a central public good for the Internet’s 
global infrastructure by managing the DNS root zone, 
the central database in the Internet’s address sys-
tem.15 
 
14 Raymond Zhong, “China’s Huawei Is at Center of Fight 
Over 5G’s Future”, The New York Times (online), 7 March 
2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/07/technology/china-
huawei-5g-standards.html (accessed 6 February 2019). See also 
Daniel Voelsen, Tim Rühlig, and John Seaman, 5G and the 
US–China Tech Rivalry – a Test for Europe’s Future in the Digital Age. 
How Can Europe Shift from Back Foot to Front Foot?, SWP Comment 
29/2019 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, June 2019).  
15 See https://pti.icann.org and https://www.iana.org. 
Table 1 
The field of global Internet governance 
 Authoritative  
rule-setting 
Provision of public/ 
collective goods 
Internet services States: laws and regulations Civil society: e.g. creative com-
mons, open source 
Internet infrastructure 
logical (TCP/IP) 
  
application layer (e.g. HTTP, FTP, DNS) ICANN: DNS IETF, W3C: Standards 
transport layer (e.g. TCP, UDP) — IETF: Standards 
network layer (e.g. IP) — IETF: Standards 
network access layer (e.g. Ethernet) — IEEE, ITU: Standards 
physical   
cable, router, server (IXPs, ISPs) States: laws and regulations IETF, IEEE: Standards 
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Legitimacy through Multi-stakeholder 
Governance 
Like any institutional order, today’s system of global 
Internet governance is in need of justification. The 
technical expertise of institutions such as ICANN and 
the IETF is repeatedly referred to as a legitimising 
factor, as is the voluntary nature of the standards 
and protocols developed.16 
In addition, with a view to the specifically politi-
cal dimension of Internet governance, the idea of 
multi-stakeholder governance has found widespread 
acceptance. The basic idea is to include all those who 
have a stake in the further development of the 
Internet. In practice, this usually includes compa-
nies, states, academia, and various civil society 
 
16 See Monika Ermert, “Missing Link. Der Angriff auf das 
offene Internet und die Ethik des Netzes”, heise online, 5 
August 2018, https://www.heise.de/newsticker/meldung/ 
Missing-Link-Der-Angriff-auf-das-offene-Internet-und-die-
Ethik-des-Netzes-4129289.html (accessed 4 September 2018). 
actors. For example, the IETF and the W3C are char-
acterised by the open and largely informal involve-
ment of companies, independent experts, and scien-
Box 2 
The Domain Name System (DNS) 
As a global communications network, the Internet oper-
ates on the principle that all devices connected to it can 
exchange information with each other. This requires 
all devices to have individual addresses. Each device is 
assigned a numerical IP address (at least temporarily) for 
this purpose. The common format for such IP addresses 
is IPv4 (e.g. 192.0.43.7). The new IPv6 standard (e.g. 
2606:2800:220:1:248:1893:25c8:1946) offers a much 
larger address space and has, for some years, been intro-
duced in parallel to the previous IPv4 standard. Domain 
names (e.g. www.example.com) that refer to these IP 
addresses are intended to make it easier for human users 
to exchange information on the Internet. 
In this sense, the global address directory of the Inter-
net links domain names and IP addresses. It consists of a 
large number of databases, each of which covers specific 
address ranges. Many ISPs also keep copies of the most 
important data for their customers in their own net-
works. As a whole, this network of databases is called the 
Domain Name Systems, or short: DNS. Contrary to the 
widespread rhetoric of the Internet as a decentralised 
network, the DNS is organised strictly hierarchically. The 
various partial databases for individual address ranges 
(such as the .de domain) are linked together via a central 
database, the so-called DNS root zone. 
Box 3 
The Internet Governance Forum (IGF) 
The United Nations prominently took up the idea of 
multi-stakeholder governance by founding the IGF, which 
was launched at the World Summit on the Information 
Society (WSIS) in 2005; since then, the UN General Assem-
bly has extended its mandate twice. At its core, the IGF 
consists of an annual conference bringing together vari-
ous stakeholders from all over the world. It explicitly has 
no mandate to make binding decisions. Rather, the for-
um’s discussions are meant to form the basis for volun-
tary cooperation, and for binding decisions in other 
institutions. 
After initial enthusiasm, today the IGF finds itself in 
a difficult situation. Its unique feature – the link to the 
procedures of the UN system – is increasingly perceived 
as a limitation. The Internet Governance Project (IGP), 
which was founded by Milton Mueller and others, for 
instance, criticises the great influence that the states are 
thereby securing for themselves. In addition, members 
of the IGP fear that increasingly only member states from 
the OECD will be able to host the forum because the UN 
places such high demands on the respective host.
a
 
Against this background, the difficulty in finding a 
host country for the IGF 2018 was symptomatic. Only a 
few months before the planned date, France showed itself 
ready to host the meeting. The UNESCO premises could 
be used to meet the requirements for UN conferences. 
President Emmanuel Macron combined the event with 
two other long-planned international digital conferences 
of the French government – thus emphasising his de-
mand for a stronger link between the IGF and multilateral 
decision-making processes.
b
 In 2019, Germany will host 
the IGF. 
a International Governance Project (IGP), International 
Internet Policy Priorities. IGP Advises the NTIA (Atlanta, GA, 
2018), 1–14 (12ff.), https://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/ 
publications/igp-comments.pdf (accessed 3 July 2018). See 
also Milton Mueller, The Paris IGF: Convergence on Norms, or 
Grand Illusion? (International Governance Project, 9 No-
vember 2018), https://www.internetgovernance.org/ 
2018/11/09/the-paris-igf-convergence-on-norms-or-grand-
illusion/ (accessed 14 November 2018). 
b Internet Governance Forum, “IGF 2018 Speech by 
French President Emmanuel Macron”, 13 November 2018, 
https://www.intgovforum.org/multilingual/content/igf-
2018-speech-by-french-president-emmanuel-macron 
(accessed 13 December 2018). 
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tists. ICANN also has a number of advisory bodies that 
are involved, via formalised procedures, in the deci-
sions of the ICANN Board. 
Conflicts over the Global Infrastructure of the Internet 
SWP Berlin 
Cracks in the Internet’s Foundation 
November 2019 
14 
With the existing Internet governance structures, 
the possibilities for using the Internet have expanded 
massively. One of the most important changes has 
been the turn to mobile devices as access points to the 
Internet. In addition, there are now many forms of 
interactive use of Internet services, not only in social 
media, often referred to as “Web 2.0”. Another impor-
tant trend is the growing importance of the “cloud”. 
Data storage and processing are shifting away from 
individual devices to large data centres. The mobile 
Internet and the “cloud”, together, form the basis for 
the technological development that is expected to 
shape daily life in the coming years: the connection 
of ever more devices in business, administration, and 
private households into what has been dubbed the 
“Internet of Things”. 
However, it is also evident that the current model 
of Internet governance systemically reaches its limits 
where genuinely political conflicts arise. Explanations 
for this can be found in recent political science re-
search on non-state governance: 
∎ #E1: First, the potential of non-governmental gov-
ernance is limited by the mere number of actors 
involved. Voluntary coordination requires a mini-
mum level of trust, as there is no authority that 
can officially sanction misconduct. In small social 
groups, personal contacts create trust; at the same 
time, there are ways to punish undesirable behav-
iour through various forms of social ostracism.17 
If one looks at the history of Internet governance, 
it becomes apparent that, initially, it was in fact 
strongly influenced by personal relationships. In 
the familiar talk of the “fathers of the Internet”, 
a correspondingly personalised understanding of 
governance comes to the fore – as well as the 
reluctance to acknowledge the contribution of 
 
17 Anke Draude, Lasse Hölck and Dietlind Stolle, “Social 
Trust”, in The Oxford Handbook of Governance, ed. Börzel et al. 
(see note 3), pp. 353–72. 
women such as Sharla Boehm and Elizabeth “Jake” 
Feinler to the development of the Internet.18 With 
the global expansion of the Internet, however, the 
number of actors involved has increased signifi-
cantly. Even though it is difficult to measure this 
empirically, it can be assumed that trust based on 
personal relationships has diminished accordingly. 
∎ #E2: A second systematic problem of non-hierar-
chical governance arises if there is no agreement 
on the services to be provided. In such cases, the 
willingness to cooperate voluntarily decreases, and 
it quickly turns out that non-governmental forms 
of governance usually do not have the necessary 
legitimacy to decide on such matters.19 In the spe-
cific context of Internet governance, the main 
problem is that a growing number of states see the 
Internet as a means of asserting their respective 
interests – and thus come into conflict with each 
other and with non-state actors in Internet govern-
ance. 
∎ #E3: Closely related to this is a third problem of 
non-state governance, namely that it is determined 
– not surprisingly – by the interests of private 
actors. In the case of Internet governance, these are 
mainly companies whose primary organisational 
purpose is to increase their own profits. Such non-
governmental governance is therefore unsuitable 
for problems whose solution does not generate 
profit, or even generates costs. One example is the 
persistently low proliferation of IPv6 addresses 
(see Box 2, p. 12). These addresses offer a solution 
to the problem that the number of addresses avail-
able under the current IPv4 standard is limited and 
 
18 On the issue of the “Mothers of the Internet”, see the 
answers to the following tweet: https://twitter.com/d_voelsen/ 
status/1098898783004446726. 
19 Daniel Jacob, Bernd Ladwig and Cord Schmelzle, “Nor-
mative Political Theory”, in The Oxford Handbook of Governance, 
ed. Börzel et al. (see note 3), 564–83. 
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will not be sufficient in the long term to connect 
all devices directly to the Internet. The switch to 
IPv6 is not politically controversial, but it conflicts 
with the economic interests of network operators. 
So far, they have often been unwilling to bear the 
costs of the migration – not least because they 
cannot pass them on to their customers.20 
Security and Privacy in the Domain 
Name System (DNS) 
The DNS is an essential element of the logical infra-
structure of the Internet (see Box 2, p. 12). In its 
current form, however, this system has considerable 
weaknesses. From a security perspective, the most 
pressing problem is DNS poisoning. With this method, 
DNS information in a sub-network is manipulated in 
such a way that a user request for a domain refers to 
a different IP address than the one actually registered 
for that domain. Calling the domain example.com 
would then lead to a page that looks like the original 
page to the user, but that is actually a copy which 
serves to load malware onto the user’s computer or 
to extract critical data such as passwords. 
An attempt to counter this problem, which is now 
quite widely used, consists in issuing encrypted cer-
tificates (see Box 4). These cannot in themselves pre-
vent “DNS poisoning”, but they do offer some protec-
tion against such attacks. If a request to example.com 
is redirected to another IP address, the visited server 
cannot send the SSL certificate belonging to exam-
ple.com – and a corresponding warning appears in 
the browser. The problem, however, is that the SSL 
certificate systems in existence today have their own 
security gaps and are still only used on 70 to 80 per 
cent of all websites.21 In addition, many websites use 
outdated or incorrectly configured variants of the SSL 
protocol.22 Moreover, it is possible to embed legiti-
mate SSL certificates on “fake” websites. With suf-
ficient effort, an Internet user can thus be redirected 
 
20 Brenden Kuerbis, “IPv6 Deployment around the World. 
A New Digital Divide?”, CircleID, 25 January 2018, http:// 
www.circleid.com/posts/20180125_ipv6_deployment_around_ 
the_world_a_new_digital_divide/ (accessed 23 August 2018). 
21 Let’s Encrypt, Let’s Encrypt Stats, 2018, https://letsencrypt. 
org/stats/ (accessed 13 December 2018). 
22 Monika Ermert, “TLS 1.2. Client-Zertifikate als Tracking-
Falle”, heise online, 20 July 2018, https://www.heise.de/ 
security/meldung/TLS-1-2-Client-Zertifikate-als-Tracking-Falle-
4117357.html (accessed 14 March 2019). 
to a page that not only looks like the original page, 
but also offers supposedly secure SSL encryption.23 
The so-called Domain Name System Security Ex-
tensions (DNSSEC) are intended to provide a direct 
remedy against “DNS poisoning”. They are used to 
digitally sign DNS data. This is to ensure that DNS 
data originates from trustworthy sources. However, 
DNSSEC is considered complicated and therefore 
prone to errors.24 
In its present form, the DNS also offers far-reaching 
opportunities to invade the privacy of Internet users. 
To date, all DNS queries have been unencrypted; even 
DNSSEC does not encrypt DNS queries. Thus, it is 
quite simple to determine which domains an Internet 
user requests from the DNS. Many countries take ad-
vantage of this to specifically block certain domains. 
This problem too has been known in the technical 
community for some time. There are, for example, 
advanced proposals to combine DNSSEC with encryp-
tion mechanisms (see Box 4, p. 15). The basic idea 
here is to route DNS queries via encrypted connec-
tions (e.g. “DNS over TLS”, “DNS over HTTPS”). In this 
way, requests would only be processed by certified 
bodies using encrypted channels. Such a combination 
of certification and encryption would make “DNS 
 
23 See Andy Greenberg, “Cyberspies Hijacked the Internet 
Domains of Entire Countries”, Wired, https://www.wired.com/ 
story/sea-turtle-dns-hijacking/ (accessed 2 May 2019). 
24 IANIX, DNSSEC Downtime: List of Outages & Validation 
Failures, 2018, https://ianix.com/pub/dnssec-outages.html 
(accessed 13 December 2018). 
Box 4 
Encryption (TLS, SSL, HTTPS) 
Various types of data are encrypted for transmission 
over the Internet using the Transport Layer Security (TLS) 
protocol. This protocol is the successor of the long-used 
Secure Socket Layer (SSL) protocol. The use of TLS in 
the representation of websites is well-known; here, the 
Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) protocol is supple-
mented by an encryption component (HTTPS). If a web 
server provides such encryption, this can be easily recog-
nised by the address of the website. If a web server offers 
this type of encryption, it can be identified by the address 
of the web site. The address starts with “https” instead 
of “http” (e.g. https://www.swp-berlin.org). In addition, 
many modern browsers now indicate when a website is 
not encrypted using https. TLS can also be used for other 
purposes, such as encrypting access to e-mail servers. 
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poisoning” considerably harder, protect the privacy of 
Internet users more strongly, and make government 
censorship more difficult.25 
Law enforcement and security 
agencies often want to use 
existing weaknesses in the DNS 
for their purposes. 
The problem of security and data protection in the 
DNS is thus well-known, and solutions have already 
been proposed. However, it has not been possible to 
implement them comprehensively at the level of the 
global infrastructure. This can be explained by the 
limitations of non-governmental governance men-
tioned in the previous section. 
Firstly, from a historical perspective, the security 
problem of DNS poisoning is a consequence of the 
massive expansion of the Internet. In its founding 
phase, there were only a limited number of institu-
tions processing DNS queries. These institutions could 
be trusted largely without recourse to complex certifi-
cation mechanisms (#E1). This type of trust-based com-
munication, however, is no longer feasible today.26 
Secondly, measures to improve security and data 
protection in the DNS are politically controversial 
(#E2). In principle, all states have an interest in a 
secure global Internet infrastructure. At the same 
time, however, the law enforcement and security 
agencies in many countries want to use the existing 
security gaps in the DNS for law enforcement pur-
poses or to restrict access to certain content. In 
liberal-democratic states, too, DNS-based filters are 
used to impede access to child pornography. 
Thirdly, both the certification and the encryption 
of DNS queries generate additional costs for network 
operators. In addition to the direct costs for the intro-
duction of appropriate technical precautions, net-
work operators fear indirect costs, which are incurred 
because common methods of data traffic manage-
ment are no longer possible with encrypted DNS re-
quests. Since few consumers and businesses are aware 
of the security risks in the DNS, it is difficult for net-
 
25 Open Rights Group, DNS Security – Getting It Right, 2019, 
https://www.openrightsgroup.org/about/reports/dns-security-
getting-it-right (accessed 4 September 2019). 
26 Edward Lewis, “DNS. A Look Back at a Look Back”, Blog, 
19 August 2018, https://blog.apnic.net/2018/08/09/dns-a-look-
back-at-a-look-back/ (accessed 23 August 2018). 
work operators to pass these costs on to their cus-
tomers (#E3). 
Mozilla’s efforts to encrypt DNS queries at the 
browser level provide a counterpoint to this. The aim 
here is to position the Firefox browser as an alterna-
tive for privacy-focussed Internet users. For the initial 
test phase, Mozilla chose the US-based company 
Cloudflare to resolve the cryptographically secured 
DNS requests. The fact that, with this system, a single 
company collects all DNS queries has caused a lot of 
criticism. As a reaction, Mozilla announced its inten-
tion to cooperate with other DNS resolvers in the 
future.27 Google also offers DNS request encryption 
and, by default, directs all DNS queries in its Chrome 
to its own DNS service (accessible via IPv4 at 8.8.8.8). 
However, Google’s motivation is not to enhance their 
users’ privacy; as the company clearly states, it uses 
the data to obtain information to improve its own ser-
vices, and possibly also for advertising purposes.28 
The activities of Mozilla and Google point to a 
structural problem of today’s Internet governance. In 
some respects, it has become virtually impossible to 
upgrade the global Internet infrastructure. This in-
vites powerful players to develop their own solutions. 
In the case of the DNS, there is no less at stake than 
the future of a globally uniform address system. 
Security in the Routing System 
The Internet was originally designed to allow all con-
nected devices to communicate directly with each 
other. The decentralised logic of the Internet there-
fore still requires that the most important tasks in the 
transmission of data are performed by the end points, 
whether these are end-user devices, servers, or sub-
networks. 
One consequence is that there are neither technical 
nor legal requirements specifying along which way-
points a data (“packets”) is routed through the global 
Internet. Various organisations such as large com-
panies, government units, and above all ISPs operate 
sub-networks of the Internet, so-called autonomous 
 
27 Monika Ermert, “DNS over HTTPS und die Privatsphäre 
der Nutzer: Mozilla will nicht nur einen Resolver”, heise 
online, 28 March 2019, https://www.heise.de/newsticker/ 
meldung/Mozilla-zu-DoH-Resolvern-Es-soll-nicht-nur-einen-
geben-4354060.html (accessed 18 April 2019). 
28 See https://developers.google.com/speed/public-dns/ 
privacy and https://policies.google.com/privacy?hl=en# 
whycollect. 
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systems. As operators of these sub-networks, they 
inform other operators which connections they can 
offer at which speeds. The basis for this is the Border 
Gateway Protocol (BGP). A German ISP would thus 
signal, for example, that it can offer particularly fast 
connections to end points in Germany and France. As 
all operators of sub-networks make such information 
public, a kind of map is created that shows which 
connections are fastest at a given point in time. 
The crucial point now is that this exchange has so 
far been based entirely on trust (#E1). The informa-
tion provided by sub-network operators is not sys-
tematically verified. Thus, it is possible that individ-
ual operators publish false information, and thus 
change the global data traffic. The reason can simply 
be a configuration error. However, recently there has 
been an increase in incidents that are suspected of 
being politically motivated. The logic behind this is 
simple: If a state directs data traffic through its ter-
ritory or autonomous systems under its control, it 
thereby gains the opportunity to analyse or filter the 
traffic. This procedure is called BGP hijacking.29 The 
following examples illustrate the problem: 
∎ In April 2010, for 18 minutes China Telecom 
routed about 15 per cent of global Internet traffic 
through Chinese servers. This also affected data 
traffic involving domains belonging to the US gov-
ernment (.gov) and the US military (.mil).30 A report 
published at the end of 2018 points out that, since 
2016, China Telecom has been routing data traffic 
from the United States via BGP hijacking through 
Chinese servers in a number of other cases. The 
company’s “points of presence” in the United 
States and Canada were used for this purpose.31 
∎ As the revelations of whistleblower Edward Snow-
den show, the National Security Agency (NSA) has 
 
29 It should be noted, though, that there are also cases 
of BGP hijacking that have primarily financial motives; see 
Doug Madory, “BGP/DNS Hijacks Target Payment Systems”, 
Oracle, 3 August 2018, https://blogs.oracle.com/ 
internetintelligence/bgp-dns-hijacks-target-payment-systems 
(accessed 7 August 2018). 
30 Nate Anderson, “How China Swallowed 15% of ‘Net 
Traffic for 18 Minutes”, Ars Technica, 17 November 2010, 
https://arstechnica.com/security/news/2010/11/how-china-
swallowed-15-of-net-traffic-for-18-minutes.ars (accessed 
9 July 2018). 
31 Chris Demchak and Yuval Shavitt, “China’s Maxim – 
Leave No Access Point Unexploited. The Hidden Story of 
China Telecom’s BGP Hijacking”, Military Cyber Affairs 3, no. 1 
(2018): 1–9. 
also relied on BGP hijacking to redirect traffic in 
the past, though it seems to have preferred the 
euphemistic term “traffic shaping”. The NSA’s 
documents describe in detail the corresponding 
technical procedure, using Yemen as an example. 
∎ On 30 July 2018, the Telecommunication Company 
of Iran redirected the traffic to the servers of the 
widely used messaging service Telegram for a peri-
od of about one hour. The immediate effect was 
that Telegram was no longer usable as a messaging 
service at that time.32 Already at the beginning of 
2018, the government in Tehran had tried by vari-
ous means to technically prevent the use of Tele-
gram within the country. 
Even though cases like these seem to be accumu-
lating lately, the problem has been known for many 
years.33 Again, there is no lack of technical solutions. 
Just as DNSSEC supplements the DNS with certifica-
tion mechanisms, there is a proposal to secure the 
BGP protocol with certification mechanisms (Border 
Gateway Protocol Security, BGPSec).34 One idea here 
is that the operators of autonomous systems secure 
their routing information with a certificate and them-
selves only use information that is certified. In this 
way, the source of the routing information could be 
identified at any time, even in a decentralised system, 
and the reliability of the source could be assessed. In 
addition, the Internet Society, an influential non-gov-
ernmental organisation in the field of Internet 
governance, has drawn up a catalogue of practical 
measures to secure the routing system – the Mutu-
ally Agreed Norms for Routing Security (MANRS). To 
date, however, they have only been supported by a 
few companies.35 
 
32 “Iran’s Telecommunications Company Illegally Rerouted 
Telegram App Traffic”, GlobalVoices advox, 6 August 2018, 
https://advox.globalvoices.org/2018/08/06/irans-telecommuni 
cations-company-illegally-rerouted-telegram-app-traffic/ (ac-
cessed 15 August 2018). 
33 See Kim Zetter, “Revealed: The Internet’s Biggest Secu-
rity Hole”, WIRED, 26 August 2008, https://www.wired.com/ 
2008/08/revealed-the-in/ (accessed 14 November 2018). 
34 See M. Lepinski and K. Sriram, RFC 8205: BGPsec Protocol 
Specification, September 2017, https://tools.ietf.org/html/ 
rfc8205; Geoff Huston, “Securing the Routing System at 
NANOG 74”, CircleID, 16 October 2018, http://www.circleid. 
com/posts/20181016_securing_the_routing_system_at_nanog_
74/ (accessed 17 October 2018). 
35 Mutually Agreed Norms for Routing Security, https://www. 
manrs.org/ (accessed 19 December 2018). 
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These proposals are politically controversial (#E2). 
As described above, the intelligence services of some 
states have a proven interest in not fixing security 
vulnerabilities. A further complicating factor is that it 
would be very costly for the operators of the autono-
mous systems to make changes to the existing system 
(#E3). They would have to update their own infra-
structure, and then fear the associated transparency. 
If an operator were obliged to make verifiably accu-
rate data about its connection capacities public, it 
would be deprived of a means of controlling data traf-
fic that passes through its network.36 
Here, too, the limits of non-hierarchical govern-
ance reveal themselves. It is remarkable that even the 
Internet Society – otherwise better known as a critic 
of state activity in Internet governance – explicitly 
addresses “policy-makers” when it comes to routing 
security and calls on them to act: “Through leading by 
example in their own networks, strengthening com-
munication, and helping realign incentives to favour 
stronger security, policy-makers can help improve the 
routing security ecosystem.”37 
As with the DNS, the unsolved issues with the 
Internet’s routing system raise the threat of fragmen-
tation. According to the report on China Telecom 
mentioned earlier, BGP hijacking by the company was 
essentially made possible by the fact that it has had 
several “points of presence” in the United States since 
the early 2000s. Such a local presence makes it easier 
to redirect data traffic in the United States or traffic 
passing through the United States. Conversely, there 
are no non-Chinese “points of presence” in China. 
The authors of the report argue for more reciprocity 
here. However, China’s approach also points to the 
opposite possibility, namely national isolation. If the 
problems of routing security cannot be solved glob-
ally, it is feared that other states will choose this path 
in the future. 
 
36 See Russ White, “BGP Hijacks: Two More Papers Consider 
the Problem”, CircleID, 6 November 2018, http://www.circleid. 
com/posts/20181106_bgp_hijacks_two_more_papers_consider_
the_problem/ (accessed 14 March 2019). 
37 Internet Society, Routing Security for Policymakers: An Inter-
net Society White Paper (Reston, VA, 2018), https://www. 
internetsociety.org/resources/doc/2018/routing-security-for-
policymakers/ (accessed 14 November 2018). 
Security and Availability of 
Submarine Cables 
The talk of the Internet as a “logical space”, the meta-
phor of data clouds (“clouds”), and, last but not least, 
the enormous technical advances in the field of wire-
less data transmission with WLAN, Bluetooth, and 
mobile networks – all of these almost make one 
forget that the Internet is dependent on a tangible 
physical infrastructure. Submarine cables occupy a 
prominent position in this context. Mainland cable 
connections and mobile radio networks are territori-
ally limited, whether to individual regions, states, 
or, in the case of Europe, the respective continent. 
Only a very small part of the connection between 
these areas uses satellite links, whereas the rest is 
mainly routed via submarine cables. 
It is noteworthy that around 95 per cent of the 
world’s submarine cable network is owned by private 
companies.38 Usually the operators provide the trans-
mission capacities of the cables for a fee. In addition, 
there are contractual agreements under which large 
operators make certain data transmission capacities 
available to each other.39 The provision of data trans-
fer capacity is thus clearly a private – and not a col-
lective – good (see Box 1, p. 8). Also, there is no global 
institution that claims the right to set collectively 
binding political rules in this area. Institutions such 
as the IETF and the W3C focus exclusively on the 
development software protocols, whereas institutions 
such as the IEEE and the ITU only address some of the 
technical challenges of cable systems.40 
“Chokepoints” As a Security Threat 
Little attention is thus paid to the specific security 
threats that this part of the Internet infrastructure is 
exposed to. The existing network of submarine cables 
has a high concentration of routes and landing sites; 
these “chokepoints” create considerable vulnerabil-
ity.41 Examples are the Suez Canal, through which 
 
38 Douglas R. Burnett, Robert Beckman and Tara M. Daven-
port, eds., Submarine Cables. The Handbook of Law and Policy 
(Leiden, 2013), 9. 
39 Mick Green, “The Submarine Cable Industry. How Does 
It Work?”, in Submarine Cables, ed. Burnett et al. (see note 38), 
42–60 (48). 
40 Submarine Cables, ed. Burnett et al. (see note 38), 10. 
41 Nicole Starosielski, “Strangling the Internet”, Limn, 
no. 10 (2018), https://limn.it/articles/strangling-the-internet/ 
(accessed 14 March 2019). 
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almost all data connections between Europe and 
Asia pass, and the landing site in Brazilian Fortaleza, 
which is used by most of the connections between 
North and South America (see Fig. 1, p. 20). 
This concentration is primarily due to economic 
considerations (#E3). If an operator has already devel-
oped and negotiated routes to a particular landing 
point, it is much cheaper to use the same route and 
landing point for new cables than to develop new 
routes. 
These neuralgic points face threats from different 
angles. Most damage to cables is caused very un-
dramatically by the high strains to which they are 
exposed under water, such as currents or sharp-edged 
debris on the seabed. In coastal areas in particular, 
the cables are repeatedly endangered by fishing boats 
with trawl nets. In contrast, based on publicly avail-
able information, targeted military measures to cut 
submarine cables are so far only a potential threat. 
In the past, the fact that Russian submarines were 
sighted in the vicinity of such cables gave rise to cor-
responding speculations; in fact, no case has yet 
become public in which a state has resorted to such 
means.42 
Already in 2010 the report “Reliability of Global 
Undersea Cable Communications Infrastructure” (the 
ROGUCCI Report) named these risks. The report rightly 
pointed out that although serious submarine cable 
disruptions are unlikely, they could have potentially 
catastrophic consequences if they were to occur: “The 
impact of such a failure on international security and 
economic stability could be devastating. It is unclear 
if civilisation can recover to its previous condition 
from the failure of a technology that has been so 
rapidly adopted without a back-up plan.”43 
Whether civilisation as such would be threatened 
by submarine cable disruptions may be doubtful. 
However, it is not difficult to imagine the enormous 
economic damage that would result if, for example, 
the links between the EU and the United States were 
to be severed in their entirety. The financial sector 
and the whole field of international logistics today 
 
42 Louis Matsakis, “What Would Really Happen If Russia 
Attacked Undersea Internet Cables”, WIRED, 1 May 2018, 
https://www.wired.com/story/russia-undersea-internet-cables/ 
(accessed 14 March 2019). 
43 Karl Frederick Rauscher, Reliability of Global Undersea Cable 
Communications Infrastructure, ROGUCCI report (IEEE Commu-
nications Society, 2010), 33, http://www.ieee-rogucci.org/ 
files/The%20ROGUCCI%20Report.pdf (accessed 14 March 
2019). 
depends on large amounts of data being transmitted 
almost in real time worldwide. Even temporary dis-
ruptions can thus have considerable consequences. 
Large-scale interruptions of submarine cables could 
probably be provisionally compensated by rerouting 
or recourse to satellite connections. But even then 
the immediate economic consequences would be con-
siderable. If the importance of these global connec-
tions continues to grow in the future, so will their 
vulnerabilities. 
A recent case shows the practical relevance of these 
considerations. The island of Tonga in the South 
Pacific is only connected to the Internet via a single 
submarine cable. For reasons yet unknown, this cable 
was massively damaged in January 2019. For about 
two weeks, the island and its population were only 
connected to the Internet via a satellite connection. 
The limited data volume provided by this link was 
used for essential services, for example to enable 
banks to continue their operations.44 
Market incentives for cable operators 
are in tension with the economic 
needs of developing countries. 
As described, there is a low probability that large 
parts of the network of submarine cables will fail. 
This explains why most countries see little need for 
action. If at all, they focus on their immediate en-
vironment. In recent years, for example, the United 
States has increased the requirements for securing 
landing sites. In 2018 Australia actively prevented the 
Chinese company Huawei from being commissioned 
to lay a submarine cable linking the Solomon Islands 
with the continent.45 However, the global political 
dimension of this issue has, so far, been mostly 
neglected. 
The structure of the underlying conflict between 
states and companies is similar to the disputes about 
the logical infrastructure of the Internet. Even though 
many governments have not yet recognised the im-
portance of this issue, it is in the interest of all states 
that the submarine cable network be protected from  
 
44 “Tonga Hit by Near-Total Internet Blackout”, BBC (on-
line), 23 January 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-
46968752 (accessed 14 March 2019). 
45 “Australia Keeps China Out of Internet Cabling for 
Pacific Neighbor”, Reuters, 13 June 2018, 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-australia-solomonislands-
internet/australia-keeps-china-out-of-internet-cabling-for-
pacific-neighbor-idUSKBN1J90JY (accessed 20 June 2018). 
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widespread failures. This would above all require the 
creation of redundant structures for the cable con-
nections and landing sites, as well as diversity in the 
cable and network technology used. However, such 
measures entail considerable costs. It is not surprising 
that private submarine cable operators are trying to 
avoid this financial expense (#E3). 
The structure of the underlying conflict between 
states and companies is similar to the disputes about 
the logical infrastructure of the Internet. Even though 
many governments have not yet recognised the im-
portance of this issue, it is in the interest of all states 
that the submarine cable network be protected from 
widespread failures. This would above all require the 
creation of redundant structures for the cable con-
nections and landing sites, as well as diversity in the 
cable and network technology used. However, such 
measures entail considerable costs. It is not surprising 
that private submarine cable operators are trying to 
avoid this financial expense (#E3). 
The Significance for Development Policy 
Beyond security issues, the conflict between states 
and companies over the network of submarine cables 
reveals itself in debates about the access of developing 
countries to that network. This access is a very impor-
tant factor when it comes to harnessing the economic 
potential of digitalisation. Today, the submarine cable 
network primarily reflects the current state of global 
economic relations, as cable operators are primarily 
guided by economic considerations. A connection 
between the United States and Europe simply seems 
more lucrative than one between the United States 
and Africa. 
Cable connections are complex projects and there-
fore designed for the long term. Economically, the 
results are lasting path dependencies and even self-
fulfilling prophecies. After all, the question of how 
reliably and at what cost a country is connected to 
the global Internet infrastructure is likely to have an 
impact on its economic development. Here, the mar-
ket incentives for the operators of submarine cables 
(#E3) are in tension with the economic needs of 
developing countries. 
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So far, there has been little traditional political 
authority to be found in the institutional structures 
of global Internet governance. The predominant mode 
of social coordination here is the non-hierarchical 
provision of collective goods. When analysing the 
limits of this institutional arrangement, however, the 
question arises as to whether more global authority 
is needed to resolve the conflicts mentioned. 
This question gains practical urgency in the con-
flicts between two central institutions of Internet 
governance, namely the Internet Corporation for 
Assigned Names and Numbers and the International 
Telecommunication Union. 
ICANN: Politicisation 
ICANN occupies a central position in global Internet 
governance because the organisation is responsible 
for the authoritative management of the DNS (see 
p. 12). In principle, this function would allow ICANN 
to resolve some of the conflicts surrounding the evo-
lution of the Internet infrastructure through binding 
rules. For example, ICANN could make the allocation 
of domains conditional upon the use of security 
measures such as DNSSEC. Already today, the organi-
sation requires registries of new generic top-level 
domains (gTLDs) to use DNSSEC in their infrastruc-
ture. However, this requirement only affects the regis-
tries themselves and not the registrars, the operators 
of individual domains, or local ISPs.46 
However, it seems highly unlikely that ICANN’s 
authority will be extended any further, even if this is 
possible in principle. On the contrary, the organisa-
 
46 On this point, see the “Base Registry Agreement” for 
new gTLDs, specification 6, paragraph 1.6, p. 78, https:// 
newgtlds.icann.org/sites/default/files/agreements/agreement-
approved-31jul17-en.pdf (accessed 24 April 2019). 
tion is becoming increasingly politicised – even in 
areas that have so far been largely undisputed. 
ICANN and the Role of the United States 
The background to this is the special relationship 
between ICANN and the American government as it 
exists to this day. For the United States, the global 
expansion of the Internet has always been linked to 
the political project of promoting its own liberal ideas 
of political order.47 The fact that the American gov-
ernment initially controlled the DNS directly suggests 
that it has always been aware of the importance of 
the Internet infrastructure. 
Originally, the DNS root zone was administered by 
the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA), 
which in turn was under the control of the US Depart-
ment of Commerce. In a process lasting several years, 
however, IANA was transferred to ICANN and finally 
placed under the control of ICANN’s Board of Direc-
tors in 2016. The “IANA transition” is regarded as a 
concession by the United States. However, in the pro-
cess, the administration in Washington prescribed 
that ICANN shall not be subject to the control of 
states or international organisations.48 The contradic-
tion that the United States, as a state, stipulates that 
ICANN should not be subject to state control is ob-
vious. In addition, the United States maintained a 
special form of influence in that ICANN, as a private 
company under Californian law, remains subject to 
the jurisdiction of the United States. 
So far, the United States has not openly made use 
of this influence. However, the meaning of the insti-
tutional arrangement became apparent in the sum-
 
47 Jack Goldsmith, The Failure of Internet Freedom (New York, 
2018), https://knightcolumbia.org/content/failure-internet-
freedom (accessed 14 March 2019). 
48 Milton Mueller, “The IANA Transition and the Role of 
Governments in Internet Governance”, IP Justice (2015): 1–18. 
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mer of 2018, when the National Telecommunications 
and Information Administration (NTIA) publicly 
raised the question of whether the “IANA transition” 
should be reversed in line with the national interests 
of the United States.49 At present, it does not seem 
that this step will actually be taken, but here, once 
again, the de facto balance of power with regard to 
ICANN became very clear. 
For countries such as Brazil, Cuba, Russia, and 
Saudi Arabia, this special position of the United States 
is in itself a reason to continuously criticise ICANN’s 
role in today’s Internet governance. China is less 
known for open criticism of ICANN. However, the “In-
ternational Strategy of Cooperation on Cyberspace”, 
published by Beijing in 2017, very clearly calls for 
equal participation of all states in Internet govern-
ance. Among other things, it explicitly refers to the 
administration of the DNS root zone.50 
WHOIS and European General Data 
Protection Regulation 
ICANN and the EU have been in conflict for several 
years over the future of the WHOIS system. Put sim-
ply, WHOIS is a protocol that allows for making in-
quiries about the owners or operators of domains. In 
accordance with the decentralised structure of the 
DNS, WHOIS is also organised decentrally. The regis-
try responsible for a domain (see Box 5) usually also 
operates the respective WHOIS system, as for example 
the German Network Information Center (DENIC), 
which is responsible for the .de domain. Registries 
for ccTLDs are usually located in the country whose 
domain they administer and are therefore subject to 
the corresponding legal requirements. However, it is 
controversial as to which requirements should apply 
to gTLDs. 
The EU demands that the data of the owners of 
gTLDs also be treated in accordance with the Euro-
pean General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). 
With this, it clearly expresses its claim to regulate 
 
49 Kieren McCarthy, “US Govt Mulls Snatching Back Full 
Control of the Internet’s Domain Name and IP Address 
Admin”, The Register, 5 June 2018, https://www.theregister. 
co.uk/2018/06/05/us_government_icann_iana/ (accessed 
14 March 2019). 
50 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of 
China, “International Strategy of Cooperation on Cyberspace 
(2017)”, 1 March 2017, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/ 
wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/jks_665232/kjlc_665236/qtwt_ 
665250/ t1442390.shtml (accessed 14 March 2019). 
ICANN when it comes to the “European” Internet. 
ICANN, on the other hand, is clearly unwilling to 
comply with the provisions of the GDPR. Although it 
had long been anticipated that the WHOIS regime for 
gTLDs would be incompatible with the GDPR, ICANN 
only reacted shortly before the end of the transitional 
phase for the introduction of the GDPR in May 2018. 
An interim solution was introduced for an initial 
period of one year; this is to be replaced as soon as 
possible by a permanent GDPR-compliant solution.51 
However, what such a solution should look like 
has so far been controversial, both within ICANN’s 
bodies and in exchanges with the EU. The United 
States, but also many other states represented in 
ICANN’s Governmental Advisory Committee (GAC), 
are insisting that law enforcement agencies in par-
ticular should have access to the personal data of 
those who have registered domains.52 However, it 
remains unclear according to which criteria and by 
which means this access should be granted to law en-
 
51 Matt Serlin, “The EPDP on Generic Top-Level Domain 
Registration Data: Phase 1 Down, Phase 2 To Go”, CircleID, 
28 March 2019, http://www.circleid.com/posts/20190328_ 
epdp_on_gtld_registration_data_phase_1_down_phase_2_ 
to_go/ (accessed 18 April 2019). 
52 See, e.g., “Remarks of Assistant Secretary Redl at 
IGF-USA 2018”, 27 July 2018, https://www.ntia.doc.gov/ 
speechtestimony/2018/remarks-assistant-secretary-redl-igf-
usa-2018 (accessed 21 August 2018). 
Box 5 
gTLDs and ccTLDs, registries and 
registrars 
The DNS connects domain names with IP addresses (see 
Box 2, p. 12). For a uniform DNS, it is crucial that each 
domain name is assigned only once. ICANN delegates the 
allocation of TLDs to registries (such as DENIC for .de and 
Verisign for .com). However, the registries do not assign 
individual domains (such as example.com), but delegate 
this task to registrars. 
Today, there are essentially two types of domain names. 
For all officially recognised states, there are country-code 
top-level domains (ccTLDs) such as .de and .fr. These are 
usually administered by a registry in the respective coun-
try. In addition, there are numerous gTLDs such as .com 
and .org. They are not geographically assigned; the re-
spective registries, too, are distributed globally. 
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forcement agencies – and whether this can be done 
in a way that meets the requirements of the GDPR.53 
The Role of States in the Allocation of 
Domain Names 
ICANN has a number of bodies and procedures in 
place to facilitate broad stakeholder participation in 
the spirit of multi-stakeholder governance. This also 
includes states. They can become members of the 
organisation’s GAC and thus participate, in an ad-
visory capacity, in ICANN’s decisions.54 
By now, it is widely accepted in practice that states 
should be involved in all questions of political impor-
tance with regard to “their” domains, that is, the 
ccTLDs. However, it is highly controversial as to what 
influence they should have on the allocation of gTLDs. 
This is currently manifested in three conflicts:55 
∎ 2-character country/territory codes at the second level: 
This dispute does not apply to ccTLDs such as .de. 
Rather, it is about the second level of gTLDs, such 
as .edu and .xxx. A “2-character country code” would 
take the form .de.edu, for example. Through the 
GAC, a number of states are now insisting on being 
involved in the allocation of these domains or, if 
deemed necessary, on having the possibility of 
administering the domains themselves at low cost. 
∎ New gTLDs: Time and again, there have been con-
tentious cases in which states have demanded a 
say in the allocation of specific gTLDs. The dispute 
over the gTLD .amazon, for example, is currently 
attracting much attention. The US corporation 
Amazon applied for the gTLD a long time ago but 
has met with sustained resistance from the coun-
tries bordering the Amazon. All attempts by the 
 
53 Farzaneh Badii and Milton Mueller, Stacking the Deck? 
The ePDP on the Whois Temp Spec (Internet Governance Project, 
3 July 2018), https://www.internetgovernance.org/2018/07/03/ 
stacking-the-deck-the-epdp-on-the-whois-temp-spec/ (accessed 
4 July 2018). 
54 See ICANN, Bylaws for Internet Corporation for Assigned 
Names and Numbers (ICANN), as Amended 18 June 2018, Section 
3.6, (a), (III), https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/ 
governance/bylaws-en (accessed 14 March 2019). 
55 See ICANN GAC, GAC Communiqué ICANN 63 – Barcelona, 
Spain, 25 October 2018, https://gac.icann.org/advice/ 
communiques/icann63%20gac%20communique%CC%81.pdf 
(accessed 12 November 2018). 
ICANN Board of Directors to mediate in this matter 
have so far failed.56 
∎ Intergovernmental organisation identifiers: For several 
years now, the GAC has been insisting that the 
interests of international organisations such as the 
International Committee of the Red Cross be taken 
into account and, in particular, be given special 
consideration when allocating domains of interest 
to these organisations, also beyond the .int do-
main. 
From the outside, it may seem difficult to under-
stand how such details can spark years of political 
debate. In fact, however, for some states, fundamen-
tal matters are at stake. They want to establish legal 
mechanisms within ICANN’s structures that recog-
nise, and secure, their claim to authority over “their” 
part of the Internet. 
ITU: Blockade 
The origins of the International Telecommunication 
Union go back to the founding of the International 
Telegraph Association in 1865. In 1932, the organisa-
tion took on its present name, and since 1949, on the 
basis of an agreement with the United Nations, it 
has functioned as a UN special organisation. The ITU 
essentially consists of three organisational units: 
ITU-R for radio communications, ITU-T for standard-
setting in telecommunications, and ITU-D for tech-
nical assistance and development in telecommunica-
tions. 
These structures of the ITU have already shown 
that, so far, the Internet has not been among the 
main issues dealt with by the ITU. In fact, since the 
late 1990s, there has been a continuing dispute about 
whether the ITU should be assigned greater responsi-
bility for global Internet governance issues. In 1997, 
together with other institutions such as the Internet 
Society, the ITU was close to issuing seven new TLDs 
(see Box 5, p. 23), and to assuming direct control of 
the .int domain. However, this met with strong resist-
ance from the United States, which – not least in 
 
56 Monika Ermert, “ICANN setzt Galgenfrist für .amazon”, 
heise online, 14 March 2019, https://www.heise.de/newsticker/ 
meldung/ICANN-setzt-Galgenfrist-fuer-amazon-4335195.html 
(accessed 14 March 2019). 
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order to avoid such an expansion of the ITU’s activ-
ities – pushed the establishment of ICANN in 1998.57 
 
57 Jill Hills, Telecommunications and Empire (Urbana, IL, 
2007), 140ff. 
Since then, the state of the conflict has not changed. 
The Western states, led by the United States and the 
United Kingdom, are strictly opposed to extending 
the activities of the ITU to the area of Internet govern-
ance. Countries such as Russia, China, Brazil, and 
Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, are trying to assign 
the organisation a central role in global Internet 
governance. 
The proponents of a stronger role for the ITU pri-
marily emphasise its legitimacy. They argue that, 
unlike the case of ICANN, the ITU’s decisions are the 
result of inclusive negotiations between all states.58 
Western states, on the contrary, stress that the man-
date of the ITU is limited to technical issues, and thus 
unsuitable for genuinely political decisions. Also, 
the concern that strengthening the ITU would give 
authoritarian states such as China, Russia, and Saudi 
Arabia too much influence on the future develop-
ment of the Internet is hardly being concealed.59 
The long-running dispute over the role of the ITU 
in Internet governance is shaped by three institutional 
characteristics of the organisation. 
First, the meetings of the ITU’s highest decision-
making body, the Plenipotentiary Conference, take 
place only every four years. Each of these meetings 
is therefore of particular importance. Second, all 
decisions at the ITU must be taken by consensus. 
This gives the supporters of the status quo, that is, 
the Western states, a discernible tactical advantage in 
negotiations. For the most part, they can limit them-
selves to preventing any expansion of ITU competen-
cies in the field of Internet governance. Third, the 
negotiations in the ITU are shaped by the fact that, on 
the one hand, the states negotiate in their own name 
and, on the other hand, they also partly act as mem-
bers of regional groups. The latter sometimes exceed 
the boundaries of the usual political camps, as they 
 
58 Daniel Kennedy, Deciphering Russia. Russia’s Perspectives on 
Internet Policy and Governance (London: Global Partners Digital, 
November 2013), https://www.gp-digital.org/wp-content/ 
uploads/pubs/FINAL%20-%20Deciphering%20Russia.pdf 
(accessed 14 March 2019); Dave Burstein, “A Closer Look at 
Why Russia Wants an Independent Internet”, CircleID, 15 
December 2017, http://www.circleid.com/posts/20171215_ 
closer_look_at_why_russia_wants_an_independent_internet/ 
(accessed 19 December 2018). 
59 See, for example, Michael O’Rielly, “Reining in UN’s 
Little Known International Telecommunication Union”, 
TheHill, 8 August 2018, http://thehill.com/opinion/technology/ 
400990-reigning-in-uns-little-known-international-
telecommunication-union (accessed 13 March 2019). 
Box 6 
The Plenipotentiary Conference 2018 
in Dubai 
The negotiations on Resolution 102 during the ITU’s Pleni-
potentiary Conference 2018 in Dubai exemplify the impasse 
in the ITU. The title of this resolution, which was first 
adopted in Minneapolis in 1998, is unwieldy, but informa-
tive: “ITU’s role with regard to international public policy 
issues pertaining to the Internet and the management of 
Internet resources, including domain names and addresses”. 
The resolution essentially touches on the question of what 
role the ITU should play with regard to the Domain Name 
System. 
As is to be expected, supporters of the current model of 
Internet governance are seeking to reaffirm the role of insti-
tutions such as ICANN. To this end, since 2010, the first para-
graph of the resolution’s decision section has committed 
the ITU to working with the relevant Internet governance 
organisations. A footnote explicitly mentions ICANN, the 
Regional Internet Registries (RIRs), the IETF, the Internet 
Society, and the W3C.
a
 
Since the Plenipotentiary Conference 2014 in Busan, 
however, the resolution also contains a passage that clearly 
affirms the states’ claim to “their” domains, that is, the 
ccTLDs.
b
 In the run-up to the 2018 conference, the Group of 
Arab States presented an amendment aimed at extending 
this right to gTLDs. Also, the preamble of the resolution was 
to criticise that state interests were not being sufficiently 
taken into account in ICANN’s decisions.
c
 The Group of Euro-
pean States, on the other hand, proposed opening up the ITU 
Council Working Group Internet (CWG Internet) to non-gov-
ernmental actors, in line with the multi-stakeholder approach 
and going beyond selective consultations.
d
 Ultimately, 
neither of the two proposals reached the necessary con-
sensus in Dubai. 
a International Telecommunication Union (ITU), Final Acts 
of the Plenipotentiary Conference, Guadalajara 2010, 2010, 
Resolution 102, Resolves 1. 
b ITU, Final Acts of the Plenipotentiary Conference, Dubai 2018, 
2018, Resolution 102, Resolves 4. 
c ITU, Coordinated Proposals Received from ITU Member States for 
the Work of the Conference, 27 October 2018, 2018, Resolution 
102, ARB/72A1/8, noting with concern b). 
d Ibid., Resolution 102, EUR/48A1/8, Resolves 5. 
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have their origins in the technical coordination of 
regional telecommunications networks. Russia, for 
example, is part of the group of European states 
organised in the European Conference of Postal and 
Telecommunications Administrations (CEPT). 
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We have become used to the idea that there is one 
Internet. For some time now, however, there have 
been warning signs that the Internet might split up. 
There is a lot of talk now about “fragmentation” 
and “balkanisation” as well as the threat of “splinter-
nets”.60 There is widespread concern that the Internet 
will be divided between the United States and China. 
Eric Schmidt, for example, one of the founders of 
Google, commented: “I think the most likely scenario 
now is not a splintering, but rather a bifurcation into 
a Chinese-led internet and a non-Chinese internet led 
by America.”61 
A real fragmentation of the Internet 
would have to be feared if it came to 
a split at the infrastructure level. 
With a similar thrust, French President Macron, 
in his opening speech at the IGF 2018, distinguished 
between a Californian and a Chinese version of the 
Internet.62 For Macron, this calls for an independent 
European path. Conversely, from an American per-
spective, the regulatory reach of the European GDPR 
is sometimes interpreted as a sign of a further divi-
sion of the Internet.63 
 
60 See Milton Mueller, Will the Internet Fragment? Sovereignty, 
Globalization, and Cyberspace, (Cambridge, UK, 2017). 
61 Lora Kolodny, “Former Google CEO Predicts the Internet 
Will Split in Two – and One Part Will Be Led by China”, 
CNBC, 20 September 2018, https://www.cnbc.com/2018/09/ 
20/eric-schmidt-ex-google-ceo-predicts-internet-split-
china.html (accessed 14 March 2019). 
62 Internet Governance Forum, “IGF 2018 Speech by 
French President Emmanuel Macron”, 13 November 2018, 
https://www.intgovforum.org/multilingual/content/igf-2018-
speech-by-french-president-emmanuel-macron (accessed 
13 December 2018). 
63 The Editorial Board, “There May Soon Be Three Inter-
nets. America’s Won’t Necessarily Be the Best”, The New York 
Times, 15 October 2018, 
The rhetoric is as diverse as the empirical phenom-
ena at issue in this debate. The analysis in the pre-
vious sections suggests two differentiations. First, it is 
necessary to take a closer look at the level at which 
fragmentation of the Internet is observed, or feared. 
At the level of Internet services, it has long been a 
practical reality that regulatory differences exist along 
the boundaries of state jurisdiction. More and more 
states are trying to regulate “their” part of the Inter-
net. This shows the persistence of the principle of 
territorial statehood. 
However, it is misleading to describe these fault 
lines at the level of Internet services as fragmentation 
of “the” Internet. At least so far, government regula-
tion of Internet services has been based on a globally 
shared Internet infrastructure of common standards 
and protocols. A genuine fragmentation of the Inter-
net would only have to be feared if it came to a split 
at the infrastructure level. The Domain Name System, 
that is, the address system of the Internet (see Box 2, 
p. 12), is of particular importance here, as are basic 
protocols for data transmission.64 
With regard to the logical infrastructure, a further 
distinction must then be made between the different 
actors driving the trend towards fragmentation. On 
the one hand, these are the states. The question here 
is if, in the long run, they will be “satisfied” with 
regulating the level of Internet services, or if they 
will extend their claim to regulation to the level of 
the global Internet infrastructure. There have been re-
peated statements from China in particular, but also 
from Russia, emphasising that, for them, alternatives 
to the DNS currently administered by ICANN are con-
ceivable. The technical organisation of the Internet in 
 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/15/opinion/internet-google-
china-balkanization.html (accessed 6 November 2019). 
64 See also Mirko Hohmann and Thorsten Benner, Getting 
“Free and Open” Right. How European Internet Foreign Policy Can 
Compete in a Fragmented World (Berlin, June 2018), 36. 
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China offers a blueprint for this. The Chinese Internet 
already represents a largely closed intranet that is 
only connected to the rest of the Internet via state-
controlled accesses. Indeed, it is even conceivable that 
China could include further states in this system, for 
example within the framework of the still vague ideas 
of a “digital silk road”.65 Russia has also announced 
its intention to test decoupling the Russian Internet 
from the global Internet.66 The “Law on the Sovereign 
 
65 For a similar scenario, see also Marcel Dickow, 
“EurasiaNet – How They Split the Internet”, in Conceivable 
Surprises. Eleven Possible Turns in Russia’s Foreign Policy, ed. 
Sabine Fischer and Margarete Klein, SWP Research Paper 
10/2016 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, October 
2016), 43–46. See also Milton Mueller, “Proposed New IETF 
Standard Would Create a Nationally Partitioned ‘Internet’”, 
Internet Governance Project, 18 June 2012, https://www. 
internetgovernance.org/2012/06/18/proposed-new-ietf-
standard-would-create-a-nationally-partitioned-internet/ 
(accessed 5 February 2019). 
66 Markus Ackeret, “Russlands Internet soll von der Welt 
isoliert werden”, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 12 February 2019, 
Internet”, passed by the Duma in April 2019, provides 
the basis for this and also contains references to the 
goal of building a Russian DNS.67 Moscow has stated 
that its aim is to ensure that it is not dependent on 
the United States in the event of a conflict. However, 
it is also clear that this will create the basis for ex-
tending the state’s control over the “Russian” Internet 
to the infrastructure level – very similar to what is 
happening in China. 
However, a threat to the common global Internet 
infrastructure is also coming from a completely dif-
ferent direction, namely from private companies, 
especially those in the United States. As mentioned 
above, Google and Mozilla, that is, the companies 
behind two of the most important Internet browsers, 
are attempting to address the security gaps of today’s 
DNS on their own (see p. 16). To this end, they pro-
vide the verification and encryption of DNS queries. 
This is still done on the basis of the global DNS sys-
tem administered by ICANN. However, it is conceiv-
able that, in the future, the link to the global DNS 
will become weaker. Especially for a company as 
influential as Google, it might be tempting for it to 
create its own Internet that is only loosely connected 
to the rest of the web. 
For now, such far-reaching considerations are only 
speculative. But they do give cause for concern. It 
would not lead to the collapse of all global communi-
cation if the Internet were to be split up at the infra-
structure level. Certainly, technical ways could be 
found to enable an exchange across the borders of 
different networks – just as it is feasible today to 
connect to the Internet in China or to services within 
the Tor network (see Box 7). The immediate result, 
however, would be a considerable shift of power in 
favour of the gatekeepers. Already today, states and 
private companies are trying to control what happens 
within “their” sub-networks. However, most of this is 
still happening at the level of Internet applications – 
and on the basis of a shared infrastructure, which at 
least partly is beyond their control. Citizens are using 
the remaining freedom to evade state censorship in 
ever newer ways. Even powerful companies cannot 
 
https://www.nzz.ch/international/russlands-politiker-
traeumen-von-der-abschottung-des-russischen-internets-
ld.1459253 (accessed 14 February 2019). 
67 Christina Hebel, “Entscheidung des Parlaments: Wie 
Russland sich vom Internet abkoppeln will”, Spiegel Online, 
11 April 2019, https://www.spiegel.de/netzwelt/netzpolitik/ 
russland-parlament-billigt-gesetz-zum-abkoppeln-des-
eigenen-internets-a-1262345.html (accessed 18 April 2019). 
Box 7 
Tor as an alternative address system 
The Tor Onion Service Protocol is an example of an alter-
native address system. The development of this protocol was 
originally funded by the Office of Naval Research and the 
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (more common-
ly known as DARPA), that is, two US military research insti-
tutes. Today, however, the protocol is viewed with criticism 
because it is a component of the so-called dark net.
a
 Tor is 
used to enable a mostly anonymous exchange of data via 
multiple encryption processes. For one thing, this allows 
anonymous access to websites on the “normal” Internet 
based on the DNS administered by ICANN. In addition, there 
is a special address format for Tor’s own “hidden services” 
that ends with the .onion domain. Although this domain 
is recognised by the IETF as a special-use domain, it cannot 
be accessed via the usual DNS system.
b
 In order to access 
addresses within the domain, a special browser is required 
that can forward the corresponding address requests within 
Tor’s own network. 
a See Matthias Schulze, Kriminalitätsbekämpfung im Dark Net. 
Neue Ermittlungsansätze statt Verbote, SWP-Aktuell 28/2019 
(Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, April 2019). 
b Jacob Appelbaum, The “.onion” Special-Use Domain Name, 
Request for Comments: 7686, (Internet Engineering Task 
Force, October 2015), https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7686 
(accessed 11 March 2019). 
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prevent competitors from challenging them on the 
basis of a common technical infrastructure. If, how-
ever, states or companies were to control the infra-
structure level too, they would be in a position to 
close down these remaining spaces of freedom. 
Somewhat surprisingly, the fragmentation of the 
Internet thus carries with it the threat of a further 
concentration of power. Although today’s global 
Internet infrastructure eludes control by individual 
actors through various checks and balances, the trend 
towards separate networks – each with its own dis-
tinct infrastructure – is poised to increase the power 
of gatekeepers, be they states or private companies. 
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The conflicts over the infrastructure of the Internet 
are deeply political, as they affect the central interests 
of modern societies. Countries such as the United 
States, China, and Russia have recognised this and are 
pursuing their own interests in a very strategic man-
ner. In Germany, on the other hand, an in-depth dis-
cussion on this topic is still lacking. The following 
considerations are intended to contribute to the 
necessary debate. 
The Strategic Context 
As explained above, the political debate over the global 
Internet infrastructure is characterised by a confron-
tation of two groups. One is led by the United States 
and aims to defend the current arrangements in 
global Internet governance. This group, however, is 
confronted with the increasingly self-confident and 
strategic activities of states such as China, Russia, and 
Saudi Arabia. Germany is traditionally part of the 
camp led by the United States. 
A political strategy must take this polarisation 
seriously. Particular attention should be paid to those 
states that cannot (yet) be clearly placed in one of the 
two groups. To this end, a recently published study 
by the think tank New America identifies 50 states as 
potential allies of the United States, including Brazil, 
Singapore, and Serbia. 68 From a German perspective, 
such a list would likely look different, at least to a 
certain extent. However, the crucial point is that, for 
all the confrontation in Internet governance, there 
are a large number of states somewhere between the 
 
68 Robert Morgus, Jocelyn Woolbright and Justin Sherman, 
“The Digital Deciders. How a Group of Often Overlooked 
Countries Could Hold the Keys to the Future of the Global 
Internet”, New America, last updated on 23 October 2018, 
https://www.newamerica.org/cybersecurity-initiative/ 
reports/digital-deciders/ (accessed 11 December 2018). 
two poles. New America aptly describes them as 
“digital deciders”. 
Also, in the long run, the advocates of a “liberal” 
Internet will not be able to limit themselves to de-
fending the status quo. To be sure, they have a certain 
advantage: Because they shaped the early develop-
ment of global Internet governance, they were largely 
able to realise their political aspirations. So far, they 
have not had to push for change themselves but have 
been able to defend the current state of affairs. More-
over, the special position of the United States vis-à-vis 
ICANN and the consensus principle in the ITU made 
it easy in the past to block unwelcome change. 
In the future, however, it will not be enough to 
rely on this strategic advantage. The idea of a “liberal” 
Internet must be constantly developed. As described 
in the previous sections, it is necessary to adapt the 
global technical infrastructure in key respects to new 
requirements and changing security threats. Political 
controversies have already arisen within the liberal 
camp. For example, it was only in September 2018 
that the United States and its allies from the “Five 
Eyes” intelligence alliance once again insisted that 
telecommunications companies must give them the 
opportunity to bypass the encryption of the services 
offered by the companies (“lawful access”).69 It is par-
ticularly in liberal states that the question arises as 
to how the power of large digital companies can be 
democratically contained. 
If the liberal camp does not succeed in solving the 
problems of the global Internet infrastructure in a 
 
69 Carolin Gißibl, “Angriff der ›Five Eyes‹ auf verschlüs-
selte Chats und Anrufe”, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 11 September 
2018, https://www.sueddeutsche.de/digital/datensicherheit-
verschluesselung-five-eyes-1.4124671 (accessed 14 February 
2019). See also Monika Ermert, “Banken und Geheimdienste 
wollen die Krypto-Hintertür”, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 2 June 2019, 
https://www.sueddeutsche.de/digital/tls-verschluesselung-
1.4317326 (accessed 14 February 2019). 
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way that, at the same time, is at least acceptable to 
other states, there is a risk of the fragmentation of 
this very infrastructure. Even more than they are 
doing today, states, regions, and companies will try to 
find their own solutions for “their” area of the Inter-
net. In this context, those states that have not yet 
sided with one of the two groups will have a special 
role to play. If they get the impression that liberal 
states block any change to the status quo, this could 
increase the attractiveness of alternative offers from 
states such as China and Russia. 
Priorities 
German policy in the field of Internet governance has 
so far been guided by five goals (see p. 8f.): promoting 
the digital economy (#Z1); strengthening the security 
of IT systems (#Z2); protecting human rights in the 
digital space (#Z3); strengthening multi-stakeholder 
governance (#Z4); and preserving global interoper-
ability (#Z5). 
The analysis of the current lines of conflict sug-
gests that priorities need to be set. The disputes both 
at ICANN and in the ITU show that there is no pros-
pect in the foreseeable future for an agreement on 
politically charged further developments of the Inter-
net infrastructure at the global level. With regard 
to economic issues, human rights, and security (#Z1, 
#Z2, #Z3), the differences between the states are 
simply too great. Moreover, as described above, the 
current model of multi-stakeholder governance (#Z4) 
reaches its limits precisely when it comes to such 
genuinely political questions. This does not mean 
that Germany should not continue to stand up for 
these goals. However, it should be acknowledged that 
these goals will not be achievable in the near future 
at the level of the global Internet infrastructure. 
In fact, on the global level it seems necessary to 
first of all defend the achievements of the past. The 
goal of interoperability (#Z5) thus comes to the fore. 
As described above, in the future, it can no longer be 
taken for granted that there will be a technically uni-
fied and globally interconnectable Internet infrastruc-
ture. If states or companies create technically inde-
pendent networks, there is a risk of a problematic 
shift of power in favour of the respective gatekeepers. 
This in turn would in all likelihood have negative 
effects, both on economic development (#Z1) and on 
the protection of human rights (#Z3). It is therefore 
necessary to defend the fragile consensus to hold on 
to a common foundation of the Internet. 
However, pursuing the goal of global interoper-
ability on its own stands in a certain tension with the 
problem diagnosis developed so far. The aforemen-
tioned political problems of the Internet infrastruc-
ture are not solved by adhering to technical interop-
erability. In addition, therefore, Germany should 
promote updates of its own logical infrastructure – 
without thereby further contributing to the Internet’s 
fragmentation. The EU provides a suitable framework 
for this. In principle, it is possible here to authorita-
tively set new standards, for example on privacy in 
the DNS system. What is crucial here is that such 
additions to the logical infrastructure do not end up 
further undermining the global Internet infrastruc-
ture but, instead, complement it. 
This twofold orientation towards global interoper-
ability and regional updates of the Internet’s logical 
infrastructure can be translated, in the next step, into 
three practical recommendations for German Internet 
governance policy. 
Restricting ICANN to Its Core Technical 
Functions 
A unified DNS is one of the essential prerequisites for 
global interoperability. There is a need for an author-
ity to assign “names and numbers”, that is, domain 
names and IP addresses. In principle, this exercise 
of authority is widely considered legitimate for func-
tional reasons: ICANN’s rules are recognised because 
almost all the actors involved see the need for such 
an institution. 
However, as described above, this functional legiti-
macy reaches its limits in cases where ICANN moves 
into the realm of politically controversial issues. This 
clearly shows that the organisation, despite all its 
efforts for transparency and participation, does not 
have sufficient legitimacy to make genuine political 
demands. At the international level, state approval 
is widely regarded as the most important source of 
legitimacy. As a private institution, however, ICANN 
cannot obtain this kind of approval; even its GAC, in 
which states can become members, is explicitly sup-
posed to have only an advisory function. 
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ICANN’s activities should, as far as 
possible, be limited to those technical 
functions that are widely recognised 
as legitimate. 
However, if ICANN cannot generate more legiti-
macy, it seems prudent to shield it from unrealistic 
expectations. This would mean restricting ICANN’s 
activities as far as possible to those functions that are 
widely recognised as legitimate. This includes in par-
ticular the authoritative management of the DNS root 
zone – that is, the hierarchical top of the DNS – as 
an essential prerequisite for global interoperability 
(see Box 2, p. 12). 
This position is not uncontroversial and would 
have to be proactively promoted. A good starting 
point for this is the GAC. Germany is represented here 
and could coordinate its activities with other EU 
states. In addition, it would not be improper to also 
try to convince German companies involved in ICANN 
to support this policy. 
With regard to ccTLDs, a certain political division 
of labour has already developed that fits with the idea 
of restricting ICANN to its core technical functions. 
The GAC is granted a special role when it comes to 
political issues concerning ccTLDs, and it is recog-
nised that the registries responsible for ccTLDs (see 
Box 5, p. 23) are subject to the jurisdiction of the re-
spective states, for example that DENIC – the registry 
for the .de domain – is subject to German law. 
However, it is more difficult to limit ICANN to core 
technical functions as far as the allocation and opera-
tion of gTLDs are concerned. The problem with the 
allocation of a gTLD such as .amazon is that, in such 
cases, it is disputed which registry may administer a 
domain. As long as it remains unclear which registry 
is responsible, it also remains unclear under what 
jurisdiction the domain falls. The usual ccTLD divi-
sion of labour between ICANN and the states is there-
fore not possible here. There is also no global insti-
tution with the authority to resolve conflicts, as in the 
case of the .amazon domain, in a way that is binding 
for all parties involved. Therefore, such disputes will 
have to be dealt with by ICANN itself in the future. 
With the Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution 
Policy, ICANN has long since developed a procedure 
for this purpose that is intended to take into account 
the interests of all parties involved. In the end, how-
ever, in certain cases decisions will be made whose 
political significance is not sufficiently covered by 
ICANN’s technical and functional legitimacy. 
In order to alleviate this problem at least to some 
extent, Germany should, through its involvement in 
the GAC, support existing efforts to make decision-
making processes at ICANN more transparent. In many 
ways, the organisation is already very transparent. 
However, the multitude of procedures, procedural 
rules, and stakeholders makes it an extremely chal-
lenging task to evaluate the publicly available infor-
mation. This is a particular problem for representa-
tives of civil society, but also for many states. In order 
to increase acceptance of ICANN’s core functions, Ger-
many should accordingly support initiatives to im-
prove ICANN’s transparency, particularly with regard 
to the allocation of gTLDs. 
Once gTLDs have been allocated, it would be appro-
priate, in view of the operation of these domains, to 
aim for a political division of labour that frees ICANN 
from having to make insufficiently legitimate deci-
sions. In this sense, Germany could work within the 
GAC to defuse two conflicts that have been simmer-
ing for some time: 
∎ The first case concerns the current debate on the 
WHOIS system for gTLDs (see p. 23). Here, in par-
ticular, it seems appropriate for ICANN to hold 
back. Instead of creating a universal WHOIS sys-
tem, ICANN should oblige the registries of gTLDs 
to transparently state which jurisdiction they are 
subject to and to provide a WHOIS system in line 
with that jurisdiction’s requirements. The gTLD 
.audi, for example, is operated by Audi AG. ICANN 
should thus require the company to create a 
WHOIS system that complies with German and 
European data protection law. If law enforcement 
agencies from other countries also wish to gain 
access to publicly inaccessible data, the usual 
means of requesting legal assistance are available 
to them. Such instruments may seem too slow to 
many law enforcement agencies in the age of digi-
tal communication, as the current discussions 
about the US CLOUD Act and the European “E-
Evidence” package make clear. But it is precisely 
here that we can see how highly political questions 
of digital evidence are. ICANN simply does not 
have the legitimacy to provide authoritative an-
swers here. 
∎ In the dispute over second-level “2-character coun-
try codes”, German policy could also seek to de-
escalate (see p. 23). As described above, this contro-
versy can be understood as an attempt by some 
states to extend their authority beyond ccTLDs to 
the area of gTLDs. However, there is still no proof 
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that important interests of the states are affected. 
For example, it has always been common for web-
sites to be designed in German or to use a .de 
domain without being operated by a German pro-
vider. Here, too, in serious cases, states have the 
option of turning to the relevant registries for legal 
assistance. If German policy is interested in main-
taining ICANN’s core function, it should therefore 
actively advocate freeing the organisation from the 
burden of a political controversy that has predom-
inantly symbolic content, and thus serves precisely 
to question ICANN’s legitimacy. 
Public Support for Multi-stakeholder 
Institutions in the ITU and the IGF 
For systemic reasons, non-state governance reaches 
its limits when it comes to political conflicts. Despite 
these limits, the current model of Internet govern-
ance also has its strengths. Multi-stakeholder insti-
tutions such as the IETF, the IEEE, and the W3C pro-
vide public goods in the form of protocols and stand-
ards. In this way, they make a significant contribu-
tion to maintaining and further developing the global 
Internet infrastructure. In addition, despite all the 
criticism in detail, it is certainly an impressive achieve-
ment that ICANN reliably provides a uniform global 
DNS. While remaining conscious of the limits of non-
governmental governance, German policy should 
therefore offer these institutions political support 
wherever they can play to their strengths. 
In doing so, Germany should see the relevant insti-
tutions of the United Nations as important places for 
global political debate. For different reasons, the IGF 
and the ITU themselves are not suitable for resolving 
the conflicts surrounding the global Internet infra-
structure (see p. 22ff.). It should not be underesti-
mated, however, that these institutions create forums 
in which (still) almost all states come together to ex-
change views on issues of global Internet governance. 
The IGF, moreover, provides an institutional frame-
work in which states regularly and systematically meet 
with representatives of business and civil society. 
Germany should use these forums to promote the 
importance of multi-stakeholder institutions such as 
ICANN, the IETF, and the W3C. The conditions for 
this are good. As the third-largest contributor to the 
ITU and the host of the IGF 2019, Germany has a 
prominent role in both fora. 
In this process, Germany should avoid contributing 
to the stark confrontation between the two groups 
described above and, instead, should take up con-
structive criticism of the existing institutions of global 
Internet governance. This would send an important 
signal to those states that express such justified criti-
cism. As in the case of ICANN, the challenge for insti-
tutions such as the IETF, the IEEE, and the W3C is to 
create meaningful transparency. In addition, the fact 
that companies play a dominant role in these insti-
tutions deserves attention (see p. 10). In order to 
reduce this problem to at least a tolerable level, the 
participation of civil society and science should be 
strengthened. 
Germany should also be more consistent in its 
domestic and foreign policy. Both at the level of the 
Internet infrastructure (e.g. broadband expansion, 
5G) and at the level of Internet services (e.g. Network 
Enforcement Act), the German government has the 
chance to demonstrate what kind of multi-stake-
holder involvement it deems appropriate – and also, 
where it sees the limits of participation by non-state 
actors. 
Updates to the Internet Infrastructure on 
the European Level 
The previous recommendations have focussed on how 
Germany can use its influence in ICANN, the ITU, and 
the IGF to pursue the goal of preserving global inter-
operability. The political effort to maintain a common 
technical infrastructure at the global level will not, 
however, resolve the conflicts about the further devel-
opment of this infrastructure. On the contrary, the 
price of maintaining global interoperability will likely 
be to accept, at least for the moment, that these con-
flicts will not be addressed. However, if global solu-
tions to these conflicts – and the underlying cracks 
in the Internet’s foundation – are not attainable in 
the foreseeable future, Germany should make every 
effort to promote the search for solutions within the 
EU.70 
 
70 On this point, see also Matthias Kettemann, Wolfgang 
Kleinwächter and Max Senges, The Time Is Right for Europe to 
Take the Lead in Global Internet Governance, Normative Orders 
Working Paper 2/2018 (Frankfurt: Goethe Universität, Feb-
ruary 2018); Hohmann and Benner, Getting “Free and Open” 
Right (see note 64). 
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In principle, the EU has clearly positioned itself as 
a proponent of a “liberal” Internet governance policy. 
In 2014, for example, Neelie Kroes, then the Commis-
sioner for the Digital Agenda, expressed strong com-
mitment to ICANN and the multi-stakeholder model 
of Internet governance. Yet, the future of the Internet 
is controversial also within the EU. With the GDPR, 
the EU has recently established itself as an advocate 
of data protection. However, the e-privacy regulation 
that is supposed to build on the GDPR and formulate 
rules specifically for digital communication is the 
subject of fierce debate. There is disagreement both 
among the member states and between member 
states and European companies. Also in Europe, law 
enforcement and security agencies are trying vigor-
ously, both legally and operationally, to find new 
ways of circumventing encryption procedures for 
their own purposes. Thus, in order to tackle the struc-
tural problems of the Internet infrastructure at the 
European level, as described above, first of all a lot 
of persuasion will be needed. 
European updates of the Internet’s 
logical infrastructure should com-
plement the global infrastructure – 
and must not add further to its 
fragmentation. 
The focus on the European level, however, also 
creates a tension with the goal of global interoperabil-
ity. In order to prevent this tension from turning into 
a contradiction, all developments in Europe should 
complement the global infrastructure – and must 
not add further to its fragmentation. In the following, 
the meaning of this requirement is exemplified by 
returning to the previously analysed conflicts over 
the global Internet infrastructure. 
For instance, measures to increase security and 
data protection in Europe can be implemented with-
out compromising compatibility with other configu-
rations. The EU could, for example, require European 
registrars (see Box 5, p. 23) and ISPs to use DNSSEC. At 
least for all European ccTLDs, this would significantly 
increase the level of security, as well as for all gTLDs 
registered in Europe. In a similar vein, the EU could 
make it mandatory for ISPs to encrypt their custom-
ers’ DNS requests in an appropriate way (e.g. through 
“DNS-over-TLS”). 
The EU could also require European network op-
erators to implement mechanisms to improve the 
security of the routing system, at least within the EU 
(see p. 17). This would not solve the problem of the 
targeted re-routing of data (“BGP hijacking”) in its 
global dimension, but it would increase security for 
European Internet users. The effect could be further 
amplified with the additional requirement to priori-
tise secure routes. To some extent, this proposal builds 
on the idea of a “Schengen routing” that emerged in 
2013 in response to revelations about the NSA’s com-
prehensive surveillance measures. The idea here was 
to avoid unnecessarily routing connections between 
two devices in Europe via servers outside the con-
tinent.71 In contrast, the idea proposed here is to 
prioritise routes not because they are in a certain 
territory, but because they are sufficiently secured. If 
necessary, this can include routes beyond Europe – 
but again, in this model, priority would be assigned 
to those sub-networks whose routing data is consid-
ered to be sufficiently trustworthy. 
Finally, Europe could use its economic influence 
to address the weaknesses of today’s network of sub-
marine cables (see p. 18f.). Avoiding particularly 
vulnerable “chokepoints” – as in the case of Europe’s 
connections to Asia through the Suez Canal – is in 
Europe’s very own interest. The aim here should be to 
create appropriate incentives for network operators. 
In addition, however, the EU could also address the 
inadequate connection of African states to the sub-
marine cable network as part of its development co-
operation with these states. For Germany, this would 
not only fit well with the government’s stated goals 
for its policy towards Africa, but it might also help 
Germany find new allies in the disputes over global 
Internet governance. 
Europe has the potential to shape the develop-
ments in global Internet governance. With measures 
such as those suggested here, it can advance the 
further development of the Internet’s global infra-
structure and ensure that its own political priorities 
have a place within that infrastructure. To emphasise 
again, however, such an active European Internet 
governance policy must be designed very carefully to 
avoid adding to the fragmentation of the Internet. In 
light of the goal of global interoperability, all Euro-
pean efforts should thus complement and further 
strengthen the global foundation of the Internet.
 
71 Jan-Peter Kleinhans, “Schengen-Routing, DE-CIX und die 
Bedenken der Balkanisierung des Internets”, netzpolitik.org, 
13 November 2018, https://netzpolitik.org/2013/schengen-
routing-de-cix-und-die-bedenken-der-balkanisierung-des-
internets/ (accessed 11 December 2018). 
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Abbreviations 
BGP Border Gateway Protocol 
BGPsec Border Gateway Protocol Security 
BMWi Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs / Bundes-
ministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie 
ccTLD Country-Code Top Level Domain 
CEPT European Conference of Postal and 
Telecommunications Administrations 
CWG 
Internet 
Council Working Group Internet (ITU) 
DARPA Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
DENIC German Network Information Center / Deutsches 
Network Information Center 
DNS Domain Name System 
DNSSEC Domain Name System Security Extensions 
EU European Union 
GAC Governmental Advisory Committee (ICANN) 
GDPR General Data Protection Regulation 
gTLD  Generic Top-Level Domain 
IAB Internet Architecture Board 
IANA Internet Assigned Numbers Authority 
ICANN Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and 
Numbers 
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 
IETF Internet Engineering Task Force 
IGF Internet Governance Forum 
IGP Internet Governance Project 
IPv4 Internet Protocol Version 4 
ISP Internet Service Provider 
ITU International Telecommunication Union 
IXP Internet Exchange Point 
MANRS Mutually Agreed Norms for Routing Security 
NSA National Security Agency 
NTIA National Telecommunications and Information 
Administration 
RIR Regional Internet Registry 
SSL Secure Socket Layer 
TCP/IP Transmission Control Protocol / Internet Protocol 
TLS Transport Layer Security 
W3C World Wide Web Consortium 
WSIS World Summit on the Information Society 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
